



BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



1948



2015



OUTLINE

1. Initial remarks
2. The Brazilian adherence to peace operations
3. The Brazilian history in peace operations
4. Haiti: a special chapter
5. Gains of participation in peace operations
6. Final remarks



1. INITIAL REMARKS

- * Brazil inaugurated its participation in PKO in 1948 as part of the UNSCOB (United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans) with observers and diplomats.
- * Since then, the country has taken part in 53 peace operations and special political missions under the UN supervision, and other six established by the OAS.
- * Brazil has deployed around 52,000 troops, observers and staff members in 30 countries, as part of the UN's effort in the promotion of peace and security around the world.
- * Brazil has expressed higher concern regarding Mandates established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, although has participated in 74% of those Missions.
- * The Brazilian insertion in the international effort for the promotion of peace and security has reached such level of participation that there is no way back.




2. THE BRAZILIAN ADHERENCE TO PEACE OPERATIONS

- a. Specific interests
- b. Generic interests
- c. Legal framework
- d. Main challenges
- e. Areas of special consideration



a. Specific interests

* In the Brazilian perspective, the specific interests associated to peace operations have traditionally focused **three geographical areas**: Portuguese speaking countries (Angola, Mozambique, Timor Leste and Guinea-Bissau), Haiti and Lebanon.



* Since the inception of UNPKO, Brazil has seeking a **regular presence** of individually deployed personnel in key missions.




b. Generic interests

- * The Brazilian participation over the UN history has revealed the country's preference to **multilateralism**, mainly when dealing with regional tragedies and crises.
- * Brazil has established higher priority to **multilateral negotiations** with international actors (organisms, countries and blocks) as an option to ensure its **political autonomy** and to strengthen the country's **higher interests**.
- * **Multilateral insertion** serves to compensate **international asymmetries**, allowing better presence in the global environment.
- * The recent (since 2004) Latin American collective participation in Haiti has been understood as a strong tool to **strengthen regional relations** in several areas of cooperation, promoting more **stability** and **harmony** among the countries.
- * Brazil understands that its contribution for the promotion of the **global peace and security** makes the country as a true option in the discussions of the **enlargement** of the SC's Permanent Members.



c. Legal framework



LIVRO BRANCO de Defesa Nacional





c. Legal framework

- * Historically, Brazil has a strong preference towards **diplomacy, international law, multilateralism, consent** and **consensus building**.
- * In its international actions, the country also follows two key principles: **peaceful conflict-resolution** and **non-intervention**, both mentioned in Article 4 of the Constitution.
- * These **principles, values and beliefs** justify the Brazil's participation in peace operations, and they explain why the country **balances** its decision to engage in **Chapter VII** missions.



c. Legal framework

1. Legislation:

* Law # 2953 (1956):

The deployment of Brazilian Armed Forces outside national territory can only happen after the **authorization of National Congress**.

(Note: this is valid until today and is mandatory to collective missions, not individual ones)

* Federal Constitution (October 1988), Article 4:

Brazil's **international relations** are governed by relevant principles related to peacekeeping operations: **(I)** national independence; **(II)** prevalence of human rights; **(III)** self-determination of the peoples; **(IV)** non-intervention; **(VI)** defense of peace; and **(VII)** peaceful settlement of disputes

(Note: this is a selection)

* Complementary law # 97 to the Constitution (1999):

Military means in peacekeeping missions is one of the modalities of employing Brazilian Armed Forces, among other things.



c. Legal framework

2. Policy Papers and documents:

* National Defence Policy (2012):

Item 5.12 reinforces the **six principles** included in Article 4 of Federal Constitution.

Item 7.14 reinforces that Brazil should be **capable** to participate in UN operations.

* National Defence Strategy (2012):

“(...) 19. To prepare the Armed Forces to perform growing responsibilities in peacekeeping operations.

*In such operations, the Armed Forces will act under the **guidance of the United Nations**, or in support to the **initiative of multilateral organizations from the region.**”*



c. Legal framework

2. Policy Papers and documents:

* National Defence Strategy (2012):

Inside the session “Strategic Actions”:

“1. Brazil shall expand its participation in peacekeeping operations, under the aegis of the UN or of a regional multilateral organization, according to the national interests.

2. The Ministry of Defense will promote actions aiming to increase the activities of a Peacekeeping Operations Instruction Center. For this purpose, the Ministry will provide the necessary support in order to make the Center a regional reference in the joint training for peacekeeping operations and for humanitarian demining”.



c. Legal framework

2. Policy Papers and documents:

* Defence White Book (2012):

- Session “International System” stresses the importance of Brazil’s engagement in peacekeeping:

“The most evident expression of Brazil’s growing importance in peace and security initiatives is its role in peacekeeping operations.”

- The White Book is also clear on the limits of peacekeeping:

“Peacekeeping must never be used as an intervention in a military conflict favoring one side or another”.

“Peacekeeping missions should not seek to replace belligerent parties.”



d. Main challenges





d. Main challenges

1. National challenges:

- * Brazil pointed that the participation in peacekeeping mission implies **risks** and **costs**;
- * Brazil assesses **potential threats** before committing to a peacekeeping mission. They include military considerations about **equipment**, **infra-structure** and **logistical** support, as well as the analysis of the **Mandate**;
- * **Financial** issues are also relevant (deployment and maintenance). The UN reimbursements are **below** what is invested by Brazil;
- * The difficulty in communicating in other languages has brought Brazil to dedicate special attention on the **selection of commanders**, in all levels; and
- * The engagement of **police officers** and **civilian experts** in peace operations should be increased.



d. Main challenges

2. UN challenges:

- * Limited framework on training and deployment of troops;
- * Extremely ambitious Mandates that threaten both legitimacy and credibility of the Mission;
- * Lack of political support from the international community, especially from the UN Security Council, to robust peacekeeping missions; and
- * Low support regarding technology in equipment and systems (financial implications).
- * Others also raised by the HLIPPO.



e. Areas of special consideration





e. Areas of special consideration

1. Drones, Intelligence gathering and sovereignty:

- * Brazil supports the use of **new technologies**. However, it raises **financial**, **legal**, and **technical** concerns.
- * New technology should not compete for scarce **resources**, respect **sovereignty** and be used in a **transparent** and **responsible** manner, to **enhance** the performance of peacekeepers, and not to **replace** them.
- * Brazil uses a small drone in **MINUSTAH**, authorized by DPKO.



e. Areas of special consideration

2. Protection of civilians (POC):

* Brazil's official position on protection of civilians (PoC) is marked by: (1) **high level of civilian deaths** in armed conflicts; (2) the need of **humanitarian support**; and (3) **arms trade**, once they are eventually responsible for putting civilians in danger.

* Since 2004 Brazil's discourse states that **peacekeeping missions** are also responsible for **implementing PoC strategies**.

* In **2009**, Brazil included **legal** and **accountability** aspects in its position, advocating that the tools under Chapter VII should be **used only when necessary** and with a high level of **specificity** and **monitoring**.



e. Areas of special consideration

3. Use of Force (UoF):

* Brazil establishes differences between “robust missions” and “offensive actions”. “Robustness” has to do with the troops’ **dissuasion** attitude and **proactive status**, exposing the peacekeepers’ **operational and self-defense capabilities**. “Offensive actions” are planned operations aimed to specific target (s).

* Brazil’s position supports the UoF defined by Rules of Engagement, reflecting **International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law’s** posture.

* Brazilian contingents have used force in **self-defense and in the defense of the Mandate** within rules of engagement and the directives for using force in the mission area (MINUSTAH, 2004-2007).



e. Areas of special consideration

4. Security Sector Reform (SSR):

- * Brazil does not understand divisions between “**peacekeeping**” and “**peacebuilding**” activities.

- * **SSR** activities must be aligned with **national priorities and strategies**, respecting general principles of **national ownership**. They must involve **local actors** and consider **political**, **economic** and justice references.

- * Brazil positions itself **against** international interference in **domestic politics**, especially **military** involvement.



e. Areas of special consideration

5. Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Operations :


* Brazil considers the **participation of women** in peace operations as a key to improve **effectiveness** with a direct impact in **conflict resolution** and **mediation** efforts.

* The **low level of women participation in peace operations** reflects the Brazilian Armed Forces reality, specially the **Army** (the military branch that most sends troops to peace operations).



e. Areas of special consideration

5. Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Operations :



Source: Igarapé Institute



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS






3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

- * The **origin** of the Brazilian participation in peace operations coincides with the **creation** of the United Nations, in 1940.
- * During the **Cold War era**, the country's insertion in international compositions of forces was **very low**, excepting for the deployment of three battalions in the **Dominican Republic** (May 65 – Sept 66), under the **OAS** supervision.
- * In the **90s**, Brazil expanded its participation in peace operations in the **African Continent** with several multidimensional deployments.
- * From **2000** on, the Brazilian insertion in peace operations expanded considerably, with its presence in **Haiti**, as part of MINUSTAH.



BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS (closed Missions)





3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)




UNEF I – Egypt (1957-1967) – 1 IN BN



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)




FAIBRAS/OAS – Dominican Republic (1965-1966) – 1 IN BN



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)



ONUMOZ – Mozambique (1994) – 1 IN Coy



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)

Ajuda Humanitária da ONU



UNAVEM III – Angola (1995 - 1997) – 1 IN BN, 1 ENG Coy, 1 MED PL



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)



MOMEPE – Ecuador – Peru (1995 – 1999) – 1 AV DET



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)



Utilização de Detector de Metal pelo Pelotão PE

INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMISSET – Timor Leste (1999 – 2005) – 1 MP PL



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

(Troops)



MINUSTAH – Haiti (2004 -) – 1 IN BN, 2 IN BN, 1 NAVY TF, 1 ENG Cy



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS


(Naval Component)



UNFIL – Lebanon (2011 -) – 1 Maritime Task Force



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS



Source: Igarapé Institute



3. THE BRAZILIAN HISTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS (current numbers)

MISSION	PLACE	STRENGTH	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	POLICE
UN/DPKO	NY	6	4	2	-	-
MINUSTAH	Haiti	970	785	181	4	19
UNIFIL	Lebanon	268	7	261	-	-
MINUSCA	CAR	5	3	2	-	-
MINURSO	Western Sahara	10	7	1	2	-
UNFYCIP	Cyprus	1	1	-	-	-
UNMISS	South Sudan	13	7	-	1	5
UNISFA	Sudan	5	3	1	1	-
MONUSCO	DRC	7	7	-	-	-
UNOCI	Côte Ivoire	7	4	2	1	-
UNMIL	Liberia	4	3	1	-	-
UNIOGBIS	Guinea Bissau	3	-	-	1	2
TOTAL		1,299	831	451	10	26



4. HAITI: A SPECIAL CHAPTER






4. HAITI: A SPECIAL CHAPTER

- * The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in 2004, through UNSCR 1542.

- * The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the extreme use of force in situations of self-defense, defense of others and the Mandate.

- * The initial Brazilian military structure was the so-called “Haiti Brigade”, which was reduced to a Battalion size in 2005.





4. HAITI: A SPECIAL CHAPTER



MINUSTAH'S CURRENT DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

29 MAY 04





CURRENT BRAZILIAN PRESENCE IN HAITI



1 Infantry Battalion (850 troops) -
BRABATT



1 Engineering Company (120 troops) -
BRAENGCOY



BRABATT'S MISSION

- * To ensure a stable and secure environment so that national and international agencies can work (social, economic, humanitarian and political objectives) to revert the country to the institutional normality.
- * To act as a Force Strategic Reserve, ready to operate all around the country, as determined.





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Day and night patrolling





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Convoy escorting





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS


Authorities personal security





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Boundary patrolling and surveillance





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Maritime patrolling





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Joint siege operations with the HNP





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Humanitarian aid





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Humanitarian aid





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Humanitarian aid





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Key infrastructure protection





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Check points





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Strong points





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

UN facilities protection





BRABATT'S MAIN TASKS

Long range patrolling





BRAENG COY'S MISSION

- * To provide horizontal and vertical Engineering support to MINUSTAH's contingents.
- * To provide mobility, counter-mobility and protection to the Military Component.





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Cleaning of streets





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Well drilling and topographical leveling





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Road (street) repairing and construction





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Bridge construction





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Facilities/infrastructure construction





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

Water treatment and supplying





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

After the earthquake - preparation of IDP camps





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

After the earthquake - preparation of IDP camps





BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

After the earthquake - preparation of collective burial areas



P.S.: following Red Cross's protocols



BRAENGCOY'S MAIN TASKS

After the earthquake – removal of debris





THE FUTURE OF MINUSTAH

- * In 15 OCT 2015, the UNSC issued Resolution 2243 which **maintains the full Military Component strength** up to OCT 2016.
- * Such decision keeps a **safe and secure environment** while the HNP achieves the capability to deal with Haiti's security matters.
- * It is also consistent with the need to carefully follow up with the **presidential and legislative elections** and **taking over** by a new government.
- * So far elections have been conducted **without any major incident** (second turn on PR election on 27 DEC 15).



5. GAINS OF THE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS





5. GAINS OF THE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

- * Projection of the **National Power** beyond the country's limits.
- * Strengthening of international **multilateralism**.
- * Strengthening of **regional** confidence and cooperation.
- * Enhancing of **national capacity** (industries, military schools, universities, etc) to deal with critical situations.
- * Strengthening of relevant matters such as **HR, gender, climate, collective security, health**, etc.
- * Update of the **military doctrine** (operations, logistics, planning, assessment, etc).
- * Training of the **military structures** in a middle-risk environment.



6. FINAL REMARKS





6. FINAL REMARKS

- * In January 2015, Brazil was present in **nine** of the **16** ongoing UN peace operations, **one** special political mission, and **one** demining Mission in Colombia, under the OAS supervision.
- * The experience gathered over 50 years in peace operations has ensured Brazil higher effective **selection**, **preparedness** and **deployment** systems, which reflect greater **credibility** in its participation.
- * Brazil strongly believes that the participation in peace operation is strictly linked to the **projection** of its National Power; **consecution** of the foreign policy's objectives; **strengthening** of mutual confidence and humanitarian assistance capability; **insertion** in the most relevant global decisions and **strengthening** of regional cooperation and confidence.



6. FINAL REMARKS

* The Brazilian participation in future peace operations will require deeper discussions on **relevant themes/possibilities** such as:

- **peace enforcement** actions;
- **offensive** and **combat** operations;
- **counter-terrorism** operations;
- rapid deployment **capability**;
- more **agility** in the national decision process;
- capacity to spend extraordinary **financial resources**;
- engagement in **long-term operations**, etc.

• To respond to those requirements, a considerable **political** and **diplomatic** support will be necessary, along with a transparent interaction with the Brazilian society, so that the final decision will consolidate the **national will** to have the country as an important actor in the promotion of **peace** and **security** around the globe.



Thanks!

Lt Gen (R) Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto
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Main sources of references:

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- * Igarapé Institute – www.igarape.org.br
- * Pandiá Calógeras Institute - <http://www.defesa.gov.br/ensino-e-pesquisa/estudos-estrategicos/instituto-pandia-calogeras-ipc>
- * Brazilian Joint Peacekeeping Training Center - www.ccopab.eb.mil.br
- * The Brazilian participation in PKO: past, present and future (Sergio Luiz Aguilar)
- * Personal notes